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1 Introduction
The expected utility theory (EUT) model of tax evasion predicts a negative relation-
ship between tax rates and evasion whenever fines are imposed on the evaded tax and
taxpayers exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (Yitzhaki 1974). Although empir-
ical evidence on this question is mixed, and depends to an extent on the econometric
methodology used (Bernasconi et al. 2014), a substantial body of empirical and exper-
imental evidence finds a positive relationship between evasion and the tax rate (see,
e.g., Ali et al. 2001; Alm et al. 1995; Clotfelter 1983; Crane and Nourzad 1986; Fried-
land et al. 1978; Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann 1996; Poterba 1987).1 Owing
to the weight of contradicting empirical evidence, and its counter-intuitive nature, the
negative relationship between tax rates and evasion predicted by the EUT model has
sometimes been termed the “Yitzhaki paradox” or “Yitzhaki puzzle” .
Prospect Theory (PT) has become a centrepiece of behavioural economics, for it
is able to resolve many puzzles associated with EUT and it provides a better fit to
much empirical data (Bruhin et al. 2010).2 It remains disputed, however, whether the
application of PT to tax evasion resolves the Yitzhaki puzzle: Bernasconi and Zanardi
(2004), Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) and Yaniv (1999), among others, each illustrate
a specification of PT that resolves the Yitzhaki puzzle, but Hashimzade et al. (2013,
p. 16) show alternative specifications that do not. Unpicking these divergent results
is far from straightforward, however, as the elements of PT are specified differently
across studies and as some studies invoke auxiliary assumptions (in addition to those
of PT). Hashimzade et al. (2013) do consider some general specifications of PT, but
do not directly compare to other preference models, while Dhami and al-Nowaihi
(2007) undertake a comparison of PT and EUT, but not in a unified framework that
nests EUT and PT, and for only one specification of PT. In this paper, therefore,
we seek to evaluate, in a general sense, the marginal contribution of the elements of
PT—individually and collectively—towards resolving the Yitzhaki puzzle. By disen-
tangling the separate driving forces, we are able to reconcile seemingly contradictory
results in the literature and to clarify which of the elements of PT, if any, contribute to
solving the Puzzle. As these elements are now widely applied in the broader literature
on behavioural decision making, by isolating the different components, our results can
be readily extended to many further behavioural models besides PT.
We perform our evaluation in a general environment—which we shall term the Tax-
payer behavioural model (TBM)—in which it is possible to vary (i) the specification
of reference income; (ii) the elements of PT that are assumed to hold—to separate out
the distinct effects of reference dependence, diminishing sensitivity, loss aversion, and
probability weighting; (iii) the auxiliary assumptions assumed to hold vis-à-vis those
of the standard portfolio model of tax compliance. The TBM is sufficiently general to
1 See Feinstein (1991), however, for evidence consistent with a negative relationship.
2 PT was initially proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and subsequently extended to “cumulative”
PT by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). In this study, we use cumulative PT, but our main qualitative con-
clusions apply also to the original version of PT. See, e.g., Barberis (2013) and Camerer (2000) for reviews
of applications of PT other than to tax evasion.
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encompass much of the existing literature, but sufficiently specific to yield conditions
with clear economic and psychological interpretation.3
Our first contribution is to show that several seemingly disparate approaches to the
specification of reference income in the existing literature are variants of a simple,
yet general, formulation. Within this general formulation, our two main results are as
follows: first, matching Yitzhaki’s original demonstration of the Puzzle under EUT,
we give apparently plausible conditions under which the Puzzle still holds under PT
(and stripped-down variants). Second, we find that, although some specifications of
PT do reverse the Puzzle, such reversals often rely on the psychologically question-
able implication that a tax rise makes taxpayers feel subjectively richer (relative to
reference income) in the not-caught state, and in expectation. In particular, for PT to
resolve the Puzzle, this condition must hold when preferences are homogeneous, a
common assumption in applications of PT. Thus, while our results do not necessarily
endorse the descriptive validity of EUT, we find nonetheless that a set of specifica-
tions of PT—which includes many specifications proposed in the literature—is either
psychologically questionable, or share similar descriptive deficiencies in respect of
the Puzzle.
We examine the implications for both EUT and PT (among other variants) of allow-
ing for two auxiliary assumptions: social stigma costs and a variable audit probability.
Allowing for sufficient social stigma always resolves the Puzzle under EUT, but not
always under PT. In contrast, allowing for a variable audit probability does not clearly
improve the ability of either EUT or PT to resolve the Puzzle. In general, the conditions
under which these auxiliary assumptions improve the predictions of PT with respect
to the Puzzle are the same as those which also improve the predictions of EUT.
By allowing for stripped-down variants of PT, we observe themarginal contribution
of each of its elements. Under PT preferences, reference dependence is necessary to
overturn the Yitzhaki puzzle, but the remaining PT elements—diminishing sensitivity,
loss aversion and probability weighting—are neither necessary nor sufficient. These
findings seem consistent with the nascent literature on the relative economic impor-
tance of the PT elements—reference dependence being the most widely accepted (see,
e.g., Barberis 2013; Santos-Pinto et al. 2015).
The results of this study contribute to the literature on the use of non-expected utility
preferences (and PT in particular) to explain tax evasion, and to the wider literature
on the descriptive usefulness of non-expected utility preferences (Kim 2005; Harrison
and Rutström 2009; Bruhin et al. 2010; Isoni 2011; Rees-Jones 2014; Masatlioglu
and Raymond 2016). We do not claim that EUT is descriptively superior or inferior
to PT over the full gamut of empirical regularities on tax-related behaviour, and other
evidence relating to behaviour in risky settings more generally. Our results do, though,
3 Among others, the TBM allows us to treat as special cases the models developed by Bernasconi and
Zanardi (2004), Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) and two cases described in Hashimzade et al. (2013). Our
model can be used to reconcile the apparently contradictory results therein. Although we have strived for
widespread applicability, the TBM does not exhaustively encompass the literature. In particular, Rablen
(2010) introduces PT into a version of the tax evasion model that allows for taxes to fund the provision of
a public good (which we do not consider here). In addition, Bernasconi et al. (2014) allow for reference
income to adapt over time to changes in the tax rate. These authors show that their model predicts an upward
drift in tax evasion (after an initial fall), following an increase in the tax rate.
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lead us to question the claim that PT is inherently better able to reconcile the Yitzhaki
puzzle than is EUT.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces a general model
of the tax evasion decision that nests both PT and EUT preferences. In Sect. 3, we
analyse themodel for a fixed audit probability, and then for a variable audit probability.
Section 4 concludes with a discussion of our findings and some wider thoughts on the
choice of reference income and of preferences in applications of PT to tax evasion.
All proofs are given in the Appendix.
2 Taxpayer behavioural model
We now present a general model of the taxpayer tax evasion decision—the Taxpayer
Behavioural Model—which nests PT, EUT and intermediate variants that may be
considered as stripped-down versions of PT. Consider a taxpayer with an exogenous
taxable income Y > 0 (which is known to the taxpayer but not to the tax author-
ity).4 The government levies a proportional income tax at marginal rate t ∈ (0, 1) on
declared income X ∈ (0, Y ). The probability of audit is given by p = p (X) ∈ (0, 1)
with p′ ≤ 0, though taxpayers may behave as if they transform this objective prob-
ability into a decision weight w (p), where w (0) = 0, w (1) = 1 and w′ > 0.5
In the special case p′ = 0 the probability of audit is independent, or “exogenous”,
of declared income. Audited taxpayers face a fine at rate f ∈ (1, t−1) on all unde-
clared tax, where the upper bound ensures that the amount paid (tax plus fines) never
exceeds a taxpayer’s total income (hence limited liability is never violated, regardless
of earned and declared income). Following Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007), taxpayers
may additionally incur social stigma equivalent to a monetary cost s [Y − X ], where
s ≥ 0. Accordingly, Y n ≡ Y − t X is the taxpayer’s income when not caught, and
Y c ≡ Y n − [t f + s] [Y − X ] is the taxpayer’s income when caught (audited).
The carrier of utility, v, is constructed to be sufficiently general to nest both EUT
and PT preferences. Specifically, we first define a function u : R → R satisfying
A0. u (x) is continuous and twice differentiable for all x ∈ R, except possibly at
x = 0.
A1. u (0) = 0;
A2. u′ > 0;
4 Following the study of Kleven et al. (2011)—who show that the descriptive validity of the EUT model is
improvedwhen allowing for plausible levels of third-party reporting—it is now common to interpretY not as
a taxpayer’s full income, but as that part of income not subject to third-party reporting. As this interpretation
is not adopted, however, in the literature we address, we do not formally adopt this interpretation.
5 Hence, the objective probability distribution is {p, 1 − p} and the transformed probability distribution
is {w (p) , 1 − w (p)}. PT allows for different weighting functions to apply to outcomes that fall above or
below the reference level. As pointed out by Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) and Prelec (1998), however,
empirically the same weighting function is found to apply above and below the reference level, so we
assume there to be a single weighting function w . The assumption p′ ≤ 0 is consistent with the literature
on optimal auditing (e.g., Reinganum and Wilde 1986; Piolatto and Trotin 2016).
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A3. u′′ < 0;
A4. ∂ Au (x) /∂x ≤ 0, where Au (x) ≡ −u′′ (x) /u′ (x).6
The carrier of utility, v, is then defined as
v (x) =
{
u (x) if x ≥ 0;
[−1]DS λu ([−1]DS x) otherwise; (1)
where λ ≥ 1, and the condition DS is true (DS = 1) when diminishing sensitivity
is assumed to hold, and false otherwise (DS = 0). Note, first, that setting DS = 0
and λ = 1 we have v (x) = u (x) as under EUT. In this case, A2 and A3 imply that
v is increasing and concave. A4 implies that absolute risk aversion with respect to v
is decreasing, although we note that for w (p) 	= p risk preferences (in the sense of
preferences for mean-preserving spreads) are determined jointly with respect to v and
tow (Schmidt andZank 2008).7 Note, second, that under diminishing sensitivity utility
becomes v (x) = −λu (−x) for x < 0. In this case,A2 still implies that v ismonotonic,
but A3 implies that v is convex for x < 0. Following Köbberling and Wakker (2005),
loss aversion with respect to v requires limx↑0 ∂v(x)/∂x > limx↓0 ∂v(x)/∂x , which
holds if and only if λ > 1. Assumption A4 implies with respect to v that
A (x) ≡ Av (x) ≡ −v
′′ (x)
v′ (x)
{
< 0 if x < 0, DS = 1;
> 0 otherwise.
Taxpayers are assumed to judge outcomes relative to a reference level of income
R—the reference dependence element of PT. Thus, we write Y i ≡ Y i − R, i = c, n.
We employ a specification of reference income that we shall show is sufficiently
general to nest a wide range of those proposed in the existing literature. The underlying
observation informing our specification is that existing approaches can be understood
as weighted averages of wealth in the caught and not-caught states. Specifically, we
write
R = α (·) Y c + [1 − α (·)] Y n, (2)
where the function α (·) satisfies
A5. α (·) = φ1 + φ2Y−X ,
and φ1 (·) and φ2 (·) are real-valued functions satisfying φ1X = φ2X = 0 (where
φi X ≡ ∂φi (·) /∂ X ). For future reference, we denote the elasticity of φi with respect
to t as εφi ,t . The specifications of reference income in the existing literature that
are special cases of A5 are listed in Table 1. R = 0, as under EUT, is the special
case of A5 obtained by setting φ1 = t/ [ f t + s] and φ2 = Y [1 − t] / [ f t + s].
6 An example of a function satisfying A0-A4 is u (x) = x − e−bx with b > 0. See the study by Bell and
Fishburn (2000) for an axiomatisation of functions of this type.
7 These properties continue to hold if λ > 1, the only difference between cases being that, if λ > 1 then,
even if u (x) is differentiable at x = 0, v (x) is not differentiable at x = 0.
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Alternatively, setting φ1 = t/ [ f t + s] and φ2 = 0, we obtain the taxpayer’s post-
tax income if s/he does not evade (the legal post-tax income): R = Y [1 − t]. This
specification for reference incomewasfirst proposed byDhami and al-Nowaihi (2007).
It is also considered by Trotin (2012), and is one of the examples in the study of
Hashimzade et al. (2013). Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) make a general argument that
the reference level should reflect the expected outcome of the lottery. Consistent with
such approaches, reference income is equated to the expected value of the gamble
by setting φ1 = w (p) and φ2 = 0. Hashimzade et al. (2013) also consider the
specification R = X [1 − t] as one of their examples, which obtains from A5 with
φ1 = 1/ [ f t + s], and φ2 = 0. The specification of Yaniv (1999) exercises fully the
generality of A5, for it implies φ2 	= 0. The as yet undefined notation in Table 1
required to characterise Yaniv’s specification we shall detail later.
Taxpayers are assumed to choose X to maximise
V = w (p) v (Y c) + [1 − w (p)] v (Y n) , (3)
where, under A5,
Y n = [ f t + s] [φ1 [Y − X ] + φ2] ; Y c = [ f t + s] [[φ1 − 1] [Y − X ] + φ2] .
Table 2 introduces four variants of the TBM, each of which may be considered with
or without social stigma, and under either p′ = 0 or p′ < 0. These are only four of
many possible variants, but are sufficient to make our key observations.
The simplest variant is EUT. To understand the marginal contribution of loss aver-
sion and probability weighting, these features are introduced in the LA∧ PW variant.
We introduce these together as it shall transpire that neither is important for the pre-
Table 1 Characterising
specifications of reference
income in the literature
R φ1 φ2
Constant (= c) tf t+s Y [1−t]−cf t+s
Y [1 − t] tf t+s 0
X [1 − t] 1f t+s 0
Exp. val. w (p) 0
Yaniv (1999) tf t+s
t[ωb−Y ]
f t+s
Table 2 Variants of the TBM
Variant R Diminishing sensitivity Loss aversion Probability weighting
EUT 0 No No No
LA ∧ PW 0 No Yes Yes
RD ∈ (Y c, Y n) No Yes Yes
PT ∈ (Y c, Y n) Yes Yes Yes
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dictions of the TBMwith respect to the Puzzle. Reference dependence is introduced in
variant RD, while the last variant, PT , satisfies the assumptions of cumulative prospect
theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). As is widely noted, under diminishing sensi-
tivity an interior maximum to (3) must satisfy Y n > 0 for p′′ sufficiently small, for
otherwise the taxpayer’s objective function is globally convex. Moreover, ifY c > 0,
then the predictions of the PT variant are identical to those of the RD variant. Hence,
under PT we assume Y c < 0 < Y n , and we retain this assumption in the RD
variant to isolate the marginal effect of allowing for diminishing sensitivity. As the
most parsimonious of the variants, EUT is at an inherent disadvantage relative to the
remaining variants in respect of predicting empirical phenomena. This observation
would make any failure of PT to outperform EUT the more surprising. As we shall
now go on to demonstrate, these four variants of the TBM are consistent with special
cases of A5.
Differentiating with respect to X , we obtain the first and second derivatives of (3)
as
∂V
∂ X
= [ f t + s] [w (p) [1 − φ1] v′
(
Y c
) − [1 − w (p)]φ1v′
(
Y n
)]
− p′w′ [v (Y n) − v (Y c)] ; (4)
∂2V
[∂ X ]2
≡ D = [ f t + s]2
[
w (p) [1 − φ1]2 v′′
(
Y c
) + [1 − w (p)] [φ1]2 v′′
(
Y n
)]
+ 2 [ f t + s] p′w′ [[1 − φ1] v′
(
Y c
) + φ1v′
(
Y n
)]
−
[
p′′w′ + [p′]2 w′′
] [
v
(
Y n
) − v (Y c)] . (5)
Sufficient conditions for a (global) interior maximum with respect to Eqs. (4) and
(5) are ∂V/∂ X = 0 and the second derivative D < 0 for all X . Under diminishing
sensitivity, the second-order condition (D < 0)—implying that the objective function
is concave in X—cannot be guaranteed for any easily interpretable restriction on
the parameters. Moreover, under diminishing sensitivity it is possible—because of
the possibility of corner solutions—that the first- and second-order conditions do not
describe the solution of themaximisation problem.8 As these difficulties of PT arewell
understood, we choose to set them aside here. Henceforth, when analysing the TBM
under diminishing sensitivity, we proceed under the maintained assumption that the
second derivative in (5) is negative, such that indeed the first-order condition describes
a unique choice for the taxpayer on the interval X ∈ (0, Y ).9
A6. D < 0 for all X .
If φ1 is decreasing in stigma (φ1s < 0), as is the case for all the specifications of
reference income in Table 1, then the restriction to interior solutions for evasion places
8 Local maxima may also arise, so the first-order condition may not possess a unique solution. See the
study by Hashimzade et al. (2013) for a detailed discussion of these difficulties.
9 We do not investigate the properties of the corner solutions X ∈ {0, Y }, for the descriptive validity of
tax evasion as an all-or-nothing activity appears weak.
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an upper bound s < s on the level of stigma. We prove the following Lemma, which
extends Dhami and al-Nowaihi’s Proposition 5:
Lemma 1 If φ1s < 0 then, at any interior maximum of (3), it must hold that s < s,
where s is the unique s such that
φ1 (s) =
{
limX↑Y λw(p(X))1+[λ−1]w(p(X)) if φ2 = 0;
limX↑Y w (p (X)) otherwise.
3 Analysis
3.1 Exogenous audit probability
In this section, we examine the four variants of the TBM given in Table 2 under one
further assumption regarding the probability of audit:
A7. p′ = 0,
which is equivalent to the assumptionof randomauditing.Aswe restrict our attention to
interiormaxima, and several variants in Table 2 additionally requireY c < 0 < Y n ,
we establish the conditions under which each of these restrictions is satisfied:
Lemma 2 Under A0–A7,
(i) at any interior maximum of (3), it must hold that φ1 ∈ (0, 1);
(ii) Y c < 0 < Y n always holds at an interior maximum of (3) if and only if
φ2 = 0.
Part (ii) of Lemma 2 weakens the conditions for an interior maximum to exist given
in Proposition 3 of Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007).
Proposition 1 If assumptions A0–A7 hold then, at an interior maximum,
(i) under both EUT and L A ∧ PW , ∂ X
∂t ≥ 0 for s sufficiently close to (or equal to)
zero and ∂ X
∂t < 0 for s sufficiently close to s;
(ii) under RD there exists a 	(ii) > 0 such that
∂ X
∂t  0 ⇔ φ1t  	(ii);
(iii) under PT there exists a critical value of φ1t , 	(iii), which may be positive or
negative, around which ∂ X
∂t switches sign. For s sufficiently close to s (or for φ1
sufficiently close to zero), ∂ X
∂t  0 ⇔ φ1t  	(iii) > 	(ii);
(iv) under both PT and RD, ∂ X
∂t ≥ 0 for φ1t sufficiently close to (or equal to) zero;
(v) under Yaniv’s (1999) specification of reference income there exists a 	(v) >
− t ft f +s such that ∂ X∂t  0 ⇔ εφ2,t  	(v).
Part (i) of Proposition 1 begins by extending Yitzhaki’s (1974) statement of the
Puzzle—which implicitly assumes λ = 1, s = 0 and w (p) = p—to allow for loss
aversion, probability weighting and for sufficiently low levels of stigma. The finding
in part (i) is a pure income effect: there is no substitution effect as both the tax rate
and the penalty rate increase proportionally with t . The income effect generated by
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an increase in t can itself be considered in two parts. The first part, I Eφ , is the part
of the income effect arising from movements in R through {φ1, φ2}; and the second
part, I E−φ , is the remainder of the effect—arising directly from movements in t and
from the equilibrium adjustments of X . I E−φ always increases the optimal declaration
following a tax rate rise at an interior maximum, whereas I Eφ under both EUT and
LA ∧ PW is zero; hence, the Yitzhaki puzzle.
There are two elements of PT that can reverse the above intuition. Reference depen-
dence can reverse the Puzzle if it makes taxpayers feel richer in expectation, rather than
poorer, following an increase in the tax rate. Tomake these concepts precise, we define
the expected absolute wealth of a taxpayer as E (Y ) ≡ w (p) Y c + [1 − w (p)] Y n and
the expected relative wealth (when wealth is measured relative to the reference level
R) as E (Y ) ≡ w (p)Y c + [1 − w (p)]Y n . We write that taxpayers “feel richer
in expectation” when E (Y ) increases.
Taxpayers can be expected to be left poorer in absolute terms from a tax rate rise,
even after accounting for equilibrium adjustments in X . The only possible exception
is the (seemingly unlikely) case in which the government operates at a tax rate on
the “wrong” side of a Laffer curve relationship for expected revenue (whereby ∂ X/∂t
is sufficiently negative that also ∂ [t X ] /∂t < 0, such that taxpayers pay less tax
following a tax rate rise).10 Under EUT we have R = 0 so when taxpayers are made
poorer in absolute terms from a tax rate rise, they are also poorer in relative terms.
Yet, under reference dependence, it is possible for an increase in the tax rate to make
taxpayers feel richer in relative terms, even when they are made poorer in absolute
terms, if reference income falls fasterwith the tax rate than does post-tax income.When
taxpayers feel richer following a tax rate rise, the income effect drives declared income
down, rather than up, creating an opening to resolve the Puzzle (the RD-effect). Under
what conditions will an increase in the tax rate result in expected relative income,
E (Y ), (and relative income in the not-caught state, Y n) increasing too? We now
show that the answer to this question is regulated by the sign of φ1t . In the following
Lemma, we write “d” rather than the partial derivative symbol “∂ ” to emphasise that
here we consider the “full” effect of a change in t , including that arising from any
equilibrium adjustment in X .
Lemma 3 Under the assumptions of Proposition 1, it holds that
(i) Under RD d[E(Y )]dt  0 ⇔ d[Y
n]
dt  0 ⇔ φ1t  0;
(ii) Under PT the sign of d[E(Y )]dt and
d[Y n]
dt switch around φ1t = 0. For s suffi-
ciently close to s, d[E(Y )]dt  0 ⇔ d[Y
n]
dt  0 ⇔ φ1t  0.
With Lemma 3 in hand, it is straightforward to interpret part (ii) of Proposition 1,
which states that a necessary condition for the RD variant to reverse the Puzzle is that
φ1t > 0. By part (i) of Lemma 3, this condition is equivalent to the statement that a
tax rate rise makes taxpayers feel richer in expectation. As a sufficient condition to
reverse the Puzzle, φ1t must not just be positive, but sufficiently so to overcome an
10 Fisman and Wei (2004) empirically document an instance in which tax evasion indeed leads to a Laffer
curve relationship holding. Clearly, however, were the government operating on the wrong side of a Laffer
curve, it is unclear why it would ever wish to further increase the tax rate.
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offsetting substitution effect. How plausible is the necessary assumption that taxpayers
feel richer in the not-caught state, and in expectation, following a tax rate rise? Barring
the Laffer curve consideration given above, the taxpayer—judged in absolute terms—
is poorer in expectation following a tax rate increase, inwhich case the RD-effect relies
on a strong disjunction between the response to a tax rate rise of absolute and relative
income to resolve the Yitzhaki puzzle. Although we know of no direct empirical
evidence on this point, we find the idea that taxpayers made poorer in absolute terms
would also feel poorer (i.e., d [E (Y )] /dt < 0 ⇒ d [E (Y )] /dt < 0) compelling
from a psychological perspective.
The second element of PT that can reverse the Yitzhaki puzzle is diminishing
sensitivity: this can overturn the Puzzle by reversing the sign of the income effect
in the caught state, so that when a taxpayer feels poorer in the caught state, they
are induced to take more (not less) risk, and thus declare less income (the DS-effect).
Note, however, that whereas the RD-effect requires that a tax rate rise makes taxpayers
feel richer, the DS-effect requires that a tax rate rise makes taxpayers feel poorer.
Equivalently, reference dependence requires reference income to be sensitive to the
tax rate to resolve the Puzzle, but diminishing sensitivity requires reference income
to be insensitive to the tax rate. Therefore, the effects of reference dependence and
diminishing sensitivity with respect to the Puzzle oppose each other. Accordingly, part
(ii) of Lemma 3 implies that an increase in φ1t (which makes reference income more
sensitive to the tax rate) can either increase or decrease the effect of a tax rate rise
on expected income depending on the balance of the DS- and RD-effects. It is this
ambiguity that lies at the heart of part (iii) of Proposition 1, which gives the condition
needed for the DS-effect to reverse the Puzzle.
Part (iv) of the Proposition exploits the observation that the RD- and DS-effects are
in opposition to establish a simple and relevant condition under which the Yitzhaki
puzzle unambiguously holds. It states that when the expected value of the gamble
moves sufficiently little with the tax rate (φ1t close to zero), the Yitzhaki puzzle holds
under both the PT and RD variants. In this case, taxpayers neither feel sufficiently
richer after a tax rate rise for the RD-effect to overturn the Puzzle, nor feel sufficiently
poorer for the DS-effect to overturn the Puzzle.
How does introducing stigma mediate the above findings? Part (i) of Proposition 1
states that the Yitzhaki puzzle is always resolved under EUT for s sufficiently high.
This finding is consistent with various analyses incorporating stigma—differing in the
way in which stigma enters the taxpayer’s objective function—that establish bounds
for s above which ∂ X/∂t < 0 (al-Nowaihi and Pyle 2000; Dell’Anno 2009; Gordon
1989; Kim 2003). In contrast, even in the neighbourhood of the maximum level of
stigma, the Puzzle is not unambiguously reversed in either the PT or RD variants.
Rather, close to the maximum level of stigma, part (iii) of Proposition 1 states that the
same questionable necessary condition for reversing the Yitzhaki puzzle under the RD
variant holds also under PT: taxpayers must feel richer in the not-caught state, and in
expectation, after an increase in the tax rate (and, as a sufficient condition, this effect
must be sufficiently strong).
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3.1.1 Implications for the literature
We now consider the implications of our findings for the existing literature. We first
consider those specifications of reference income given in Table 1 that satisfy R ∈
(Y c, Y n). Tobegin,we consider these specifications in the absenceof stigma (s = 0). In
this case, the specification of reference income as the taxpayer’s legal post-tax income,
R = Y [1 − t], implies φ1 = f −1, and the specification as the expected value of the
tax gamble implies φ1 = w (p). It is readily observed that, for both specifications,
φ1t = 0, thus (by part (iv) of Proposition 1) the Yitzhaki puzzle holds both under the
PT and RD variants.11 Only for the specification of reference income R = X [1 − t]
examined by Hashimzade et al. (2013) does part (iv) of Proposition 1 not apply, for
it implies φ1 = [ f t]−1, hence φ1t = −
[
f t2
]−1
< 0. In this case, the Yitzhaki
puzzle holds under RD, but the sign of ∂ X/∂t is not determined a priori under PT.
Thus, for two of the three specifications of reference income in the literature satisfying
R ∈ (Y c, Y n)—including the most utilised specification of reference income as the
taxpayer’s legal post-tax income—neither PT nor its stripped-down variants resolve
the Yitzhaki puzzle. Note that, for these two specifications that do not resolve the
Puzzle, the ability of the PT and RD variants to reverse the Yitzhaki puzzle is strictly
weaker than that of EUT. The latter can always reverse the Puzzle, albeit by invoking
the empirically unsatisfactory assumption of increasing absolute risk aversion (and
this must be sufficiently strong), whereas PT and its variants cannot reverse the Puzzle
for any choice of preferences consistent with an interior maximum.
Allowing for stigmayieldsmixedfindings. For the specification of reference income
as legal post-tax income, the predictions of the PT and RD variants are improved, for
we obtain φ1t = s/ [ f t + s]2 > 0, such that the sign of ∂ X/∂t becomes ambiguous
in general, but unambiguously negative for s close to s. This reversal as s ↑ s relies,
however, on a tax rate rise making taxpayers feel richer (φ1t > 0). The predictions
for ∂ X/∂t are unchanged for the specification of reference income as the expected
value of the gamble, however, and for the specification R = X [1 − t] they worsen:
in the absence of stigma this specification implies an ambiguous sign for ∂ X/∂t
under PT, but unambiguously implies Yitzhaki’s puzzle for s close to s. In summary,
augmenting EUT with stigma unambiguously improves its descriptive abilities, for it
always overturns the Yitzhaki puzzle if enough stigma is allowed for. Augmenting PT
with stigma sharpens its predictions with respect to the Yitzhaki puzzle, but does not
unambiguously improve their descriptive validity. In particular, for either the PT or
RD variants to overturn the Puzzle, even close to the maximum level of stigma, an
increase in the tax rate must make taxpayers feel richer in expectation.
Proposition 1 connects to two further studies in the existing literature: Yaniv (1999)
and Bernasconi and Zanardi (2004), each of which employs a specification of refer-
ence income that does not always satisfy R ∈ (Y c, Y n). Specifically, Yaniv examines
a model with reference income specified as R = Y − H , where H is the amount of
11 Trotin (2012) uses the taxpayer’s legal post-tax income to specify reference income in a model without
stigma and claims (her Proposition 8) to resolve the Yitzhaki puzzle. The difference between our findings
and hers is attributable to a non-sequitur in her proof of Proposition 8. In particular, we are unable to
replicate the expression for ∂	R
(
x∗, t
)
/∂t in the first line of her proof.
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an advance tax payment. The advance payment H is specified (up to a constant) as
H = ωtb where b is the tax authority’s estimate of the taxpayer’s income (which could
under- or over-estimate the true Y ), and ω ∈ [0, 1]. This specification of reference
income is a special case of A5 with φ1 = t/ [t f + s] and φ2 = t [ωb − Y ] / [ f t + s].
Yaniv’smodel is not, however, encompassed by the TBM for, in forming the taxpayer’s
objective function, the author adopts the segregation assumption of the original 1979
version of PT, according to which certain gains and losses are extracted from the
gamble. The coding phase (in which the original version of PT held segregation to
occur) is, however, de-emphasised in the later cumulative version of PT—the ver-
sion we employ. Accordingly, the remaining literature on PT and tax evasion, all of
which post-dates Yaniv’s contribution, does not adopt this assumption. Does Yaniv’s
model still reverse the Yitzhaki puzzle if segregation is not assumed? In part (v) of
Proposition 1, we give a result that addresses this question, and answers it in the
negative: for Yaniv’s specification of R we obtain εφ2,t = −1 yet, by part (v), a nec-
essary (and still not sufficient) condition for the Yitzhaki puzzle to be overturned is
εφ2,t > −t f/ [t f + s] ≥ −1.
The last contribution to the literature we discuss here is that of Bernasconi and
Zanardi (2004). Unlike the rest of the literature, this study does not explicitly specify
reference income, but rather it examines taxpayer behaviour for all possible values of
R. Implicitly, however, the non-specification of R is equivalent to the specification of
R as a constant, R = c. Viewed thisway, theBernasconi andZanardi specification of R
is the special case of A5 with φ1 = t/ [ f t + s] and φ2 = [Y [1 − t] − c] / [ f t + s].
As this specification of reference income implies Rt = 0 the RD-effect does not
arise, leaving only a pure DS-effect. Hence, under the PT variant, ∂ X/∂t < 0. The
contribution of Proposition 1 in respect of this analysis is to highlight that, once an
endogenous specification for R is adopted, PT and its variants may no longer reverse
the Yitzhaki puzzle. As the authors note in their conclusion, pinning-down reference
income is unavoidable if PT is to yield clear and testable predictions.
We complete our discussion of Proposition 1 by assessing its implications for the
separate elements of the TBM. The proposition makes clear that the Yitzhaki puzzle
can be resolved without recourse to either probability weighting or loss aversion, and
part (i)makes clear thatwhenEUT is augmentedwith probabilityweighting and/or loss
aversion the Puzzle is unaffected. These two features of PT are, therefore, unimportant
with respect to the predicted sign of ∂ X/∂t .12 Diminishing sensitivity, too, is neither
necessary nor sufficient to resolve the Puzzle. Indeed, in the presence of social stigma,
diminishing sensitivity appears to hinder the resolution of the Puzzle. To see this, note
from part (iv) of Proposition 1 that, close to the maximum level of social stigma, the
necessary condition for the Puzzle to be resolved is weaker under RD than under PT.
Thus, reference dependence stands out as the only feature of PT that is essential to
resolving the Puzzle.
12 Consistent with our finding regarding probability weighting, Eide (2001) shows that introducing (rank-
dependent) probability weighting into the standard tax evasion model does not qualitatively change the
comparative statics results.
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3.2 Endogenous audit probability
In practice only a fairly small proportion of tax authority audits are selected randomly.
Accordingly, here we repeat the analysis conducted in the previous section under an
alternative assumption to that of A7:
A8. p′ < 0.
Under A8, Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) prove (their Proposition 1c) that if the
only assumptions made with regard to preferences are A0, A2 and A3, then the sign
of ∂ X/∂t under EUT is ambiguous. To obtain comparative static results under A8,
we require a stronger restriction on preferences. Homogeneous utility appears of par-
ticular relevance in this context as Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) original value
function—subsequently axiomatised under PT by al-Nowaihi et al. (2008)—is piece-
wise homogeneous. Accordingly, we assume
A9. xu′ (x) =
{
βu (x) if x ≥ 0;
γ u (x) otherwise;
which is equivalent to the statement that u (x) is homogeneous of degree β in the gain
domain, and of degree γ in the loss domain.13 For A9 to be compatible with A2, we
require β ∈ (0, 1) and γ > 1.
Whereas, when p′ = 0, φ1 ∈ (0, 1) was guaranteed by Lemma 2, under A8,
interior maxima satisfying φ1 > 1 can exist. This is readily observed from the first-
order condition in equation (4), where the final term is positive when p′ < 0. We now
show, however, that under the stronger preference restriction in A9 φ1 ∈ (0, 1) must
hold at an interior maximum when φ2 = 0.
Lemma 4 UnderA0–A6 andA8–A9, and assuming φ2 = 0, at any interior maximum
of (3), it must hold that φ1 ∈ (0, 1).
Given Lemma 4, it is straightforward to verify that φ2 = 0 remains necessary and
sufficient for Y c < 0 < Y n to hold at any interior maximum.
Proposition 2 If assumptions A0–A6 and A8–A9 hold then, at an interior maximum,
(i) under both EUT and LA∧PW ∂ X
∂t ≥ 0 for s sufficiently close to (or equal to)
zero, and ∂ X
∂t < 0 for s sufficiently close to s;
(ii) under PT ∂ X
∂t  0 ⇔ φ1t  0;
(iii) under RD ∂ X
∂t  0 ⇔ φ1t  f [γ−β]φ1[φ1−1][t f +s][γφ1−β[φ1−1]] < 0.
Part (i) of Proposition 2 extends the original statement of the Yitzhaki puzzle to the
case of variable audit probability and homogeneous utility (as well as allowing for loss
aversion, probability weighting, and sufficiently low levels of stigma). Introducing
variable audit probabilities does not, therefore, appear to enhance importantly the
13 An example u (x) that satisfies A0–A4 is given by the piecewise function u (x) = axβ for x ≥ 0 and
u (x) = ax1/β for x < 0, where a > 0 and β ∈ (0, 1).
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descriptive abilities of EUT with respect to the Puzzle. Under PT, the income and
substitution effects cancel, leaving a residual that takes the sign of −φ1t . A simple
necessary and sufficient condition for the Yitzhaki puzzle to be resolved, therefore,
holds: φ1t > 0. In the absence of stigma, all three of the specifications of reference
income satisfying R ∈ (Y c, Y n) in the existing literature fail to satisfy this necessary
condition. Moreover, it is straightforward to show (with the same procedure we use to
prove Lemma 3) that when φ1t > 0 it holds that both d [E (Y )] /dt and d
[
Y n
]
/dt
are positive, so whenever the Puzzle is resolved under PT it also predicts that expected
relative wealth increases following a tax rate rise. Thus, allowing for variable audit
probabilities does not appear to enhance the descriptive abilities of PT and its variants
with respect to the Puzzle either. Once again, the condition for the RD variant to
overturn the Yitzhaki puzzle is strictly weaker than that for PT.
The effects of stigma are similar to those in the analysis with fixed probabilities. In
particular, in the presence of stigma, the specification of reference income as the legal
post-tax income satisfies the necessary condition for Yitzhaki’s puzzle to be resolved,
but the predictions regarding ∂ X/∂t of the PT and RD variants for the remaining two
specifications of reference income satisfying R ∈ (Y c, Y n) are either unchanged with
stigma, or worsen with stigma.
What are the implications of Proposition 2 for the existing literature? The model
of Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) satisfies the assumptions of Proposition 2, where
it corresponds to a special case of the PT variant with R = Y [1 − t]. Our insights
with respect to this contribution are twofold. First, while these authors demonstrate,
in this special case, that PT outperforms EUT, we can assess whether PT has a general
advantage over EUT in relation to predicting the sign of ∂ X/∂t . Concerning this
question, Proposition 2 does not suggest that PT has such an advantage.14 Second,
the specification of the model implies that taxpayers who are made poorer in absolute
terms by a tax rate rise will feel relatively richer.
4 Conclusion
Prospect theory (PT) is widely viewed as the best available description of how (many)
people behave in risky settings, and we do not dissent from this view. Barberis (2013)
notes, however, that PT is not always straightforward to apply: in particular, the most
appropriate specification of the reference level is often unclear.15 Yet, we show that
theoretical predictions related to tax evasion and the Yitzhaki puzzle depend crucially
on the specification of that reference level.
14 Wehave shown (Table 1) that the specification of reference income in the study byDhami and al-Nowaihi
(2007) corresponds to a convex combination of Y c and Y n with a weight on Y c of α = φ1 = t/ [ f t + s] .
A possible confusion in evaluating Dhami and al-Nowaihi’s result, which our analysis enables us to clarify,
is that these authors assert this specification to be the only one with the property R ∈ (Y c, Y n). We show,
however, that this specification is just one special case of a wider set of specifications with this property.
In particular, any specification of reference income as a (strictly) convex combination of Y c and Y n must
also satisfy this property (Lemma 2).
15 The specification of the value and weighting functions of PTmay also be problematic (see, e.g., Neilson
and Stowe 2002; Sadiraj 2014).
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We focus on tax evasion and in particular on the Yitzhaki puzzle: the EUTmodel of
tax evasion predicts a decrease in tax evasion when the tax rate increases (∂ X/∂t < 0).
The PT literature provides several specific examples in which the Puzzle is solved:
our research is a first step towards understanding, in a general setting, the conditions
under which PT reverses the Puzzle. Furthermore, by stripping down the elements
of PT, we are able to (i) identify the forces that drive predictions concerning the
impact of the tax rate on tax evasion; (ii) compare our findings with those under
Expected Utility Theory (EUT). Although our findings do not clearly endorse the
descriptive validity of EUT, we find that, in respect of the Puzzle, many specifications
of PT share similar descriptive deficiencies. Interestingly, the set of specifications
of PT that cannot reverse the Puzzle overlaps with many of those advocated in the
literature. The auxiliary assumptions we consider—social stigma and variable audit
probability—allow PT in some cases to reverse the Yitzhaki puzzle, but when they
do so, they also allow the model under EUT to do likewise when similarly aug-
mented. Although there are indeed many specifications of PT that do reverse the
Puzzle, we find that in many instances these specifications imply that taxpayers will
feel richer after a tax rise, for they imply that reference income falls (and by a sufficient
amount) following a tax rate increase. That taxpayers made objectively poorer by a
tax rate rise would feel subjectively richer seems psychologically questionable, albeit
empirical work addressing this point is needed. Thus, Barberis’s point concerning
the difficulty of properly identifying the reference level is evident in the tax evasion
context.
Our findings contribute to the literature on the individual elements of PT. Of the
four elements of PT that we isolate, only reference dependence is necessary to resolve
the Puzzle, which is in agreement with its supposed status as the most accepted of
all the elements of PT. Loss aversion and probability weighting are largely irrelevant
for the sign of ∂ X/∂t . Invoking Occam’s razor, we believe that some of the findings
relating to the Yitzhaki puzzle that have been attributed to PT may more properly be
interpreted as being attributable to simpler reference-dependent models that contain
only a subset of the elements of PT. Perhaps more surprisingly, diminishing sensitivity
is neither necessary nor sufficient to resolve the Yitzhaki puzzle, and indeed pushes
∂ X/∂t the “wrong” way in the presence of social stigma.
Given the importance of PT in explaining behaviour in so many economic domains,
it seems altogether likely that it is also of importance in explaining behaviour towards
tax evasion too. As such, our cautionary findings need not imply that tax evasion
researchers should cease to explore the insights of PT, but they do suggest that renewed
focus must be placed on the specification of reference income and preferences. In
particular, if researchers wish to retain the common assumption of homogeneous
preferences then specifications of reference income beyond those encompassed by
our model must be sought, for otherwise taxpayers must feel subjectively richer after
a tax rate rise for PT to reverse the Puzzle.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 Under A6 the first derivative in (4) is decreasing, and when an inte-
rior maximum exists it must also switch sign on (0, Y ). Hence, limX↓0 ∂V/∂ X ≥ 0
and limX↑Y ∂V/∂ X ≤ 0. Taking the limit of (4) as X ↑ Y , and noting that
limX↑Y {v (Y n) − v (Y c)} = 0 by A1, the latter inequality in the preceding sen-
tence implies
φ1 ≥ lim
X↑Y
w (p (Y )) v′ (Y c)
[1 − w (p (Y ))] v′ (Y n) + w (p (Y )) v′ (Y c) .
Using (1), this may be re-written as
φ1 ≥
{
limX↑Y λw(p(X))1−w(p(X))+λw(p(X)) if φ2 = 0;
limX↑Y w (p (X)) otherwise.
unionsq
Proof of Lemma 2 (i) Suppose, by way of contradiction, φ1 ≥ 1 then the first deriva-
tive in (4) with p′ = 0 is always negative, thus ruling out the possibility of an interior
maximum. Hence, φ1 < 1 at an interior maximum. Next, the proof of Lemma 1
establishes that either φ1 ≥ limX↑Y w (p (X)) > 0 or
φ1 ≥ lim
X↑Y
λw (p (X))
1 − w (p (X)) + λw (p (X)) ≥ w (p (X)) > 0.
Hence, φ1 > 0.
(ii) We first show that φ2 = 0 implies that Y c < R < Y n . Equation (2) becomes
R = φ1Y c + [1 − φ1] Y n . By Lemma 2, φ1 ∈ (0, 1), hence R is a convex combination
of Y n and Y c.
We now show that Y c < R < Y n for all X ∈ (0, Y ) implies φ2 = 0. Y n > 0 >
Y c holds for all X ∈ (0, Y ). At X = Y , however, it holds that Y n = Y c = Y [1 − t],
so Y n = Y c = 0. Therefore, as R ∈ [Y n, Y c] arbitrarily close to X = Y ,
by continuity, we must have R = Y n = Y c = Y [1 − t] at X = Y . However,
when X = Y , Eq. (2) gives R = Y [1 − t] − [ f t + s]φ2, which is consistent with
R = Y [1 − t] also holding only if [ f t + s]φ2 = 0, hence φ2 = 0. unionsq
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Proof of Proposition 1 We start by proving statement (i). Under the parameter restric-
tions defining LA ∧ PW the derivative ∂ X/∂t , found implicitly from (4), is
∂ X
∂t
= − 1
D
[
[1−w (p)] t Xv′′ (Y n)−w (p) {t [ f − 1] + s} [X + f [Y − X ]] v′′ (Y c)
+ w (p) [ f − 1] v′ (Y c) − [1 − w (p)] v′ (Y n)] .
Substituting from the first-order condition, we obtain
∂ X
∂t
= − 1
D
{
[1 − w (p)] tv′ (Y n) [Y [A (Y c) − A (Y n)] + [Y − X ] [A (Y n) + [ f − 1] A (Y c)]]
−w (p) s
t
v′
(
Y c
)
}
.
If s = 0 this rewrites as
∂ X
∂t
= 1
t
[
[Y − X ] + Y
[
A (Y c) − A (Y n)]
[ f − 1] A (Y c) + A (Y n)
]
. (A.1)
Under A4, A (Y c) − A (Y n) ≥ 0, hence ∂ X/∂t > 0. As equation (A.1) holds for
w (p) = p, and is independent of λ, ∂ X/∂t ≥ 0 also holds under EUT. If s ↑ s¯ then
X ↑ Y and A (Y c) ↓ A (Y n) so
∂ X
∂t
= lim
s↑s¯
w (p) s
t D
v′
(
Y c
)
< 0.
(ii–iv).Under the relevant parameter restrictions the derivative ∂ X/∂t , found implicitly
from the first-order condition, is
∂ X
∂t
= [ f t + s]
D
×
⎡
⎣
φ1t
[
w (p) v′ (Y c) + [1 − w (p)] v′ (Y n)]
+ [Y − X ]
[
w (p) [φ1 − 1] [ f [φ1 − 1] + φ1t [ f t + s]] v′′ (Y c)
+φ1 [1 − w (p)] [ f φ1 + φ1t [ f t + s]] v′′ (Y n)
]
⎤
⎦ .
After some algebra and using the first-order condition to simplify the equation, we
obtain:
∂ X
∂t
= f [Y − X ]
f t + s +
[ f t + s]φ1t
D
[
1
φ1
[
w (p) v′
(
Y c
)]
+ φ1 [ f t + s] [Y − X ] [1 − w (p)] v′
(
Y n
) [
A
(
Y c
) − A (Y n)]] .
(A.2)
Equation (A.2) allows us to prove parts (ii–iv). Notice that the first term in (A.2) is
always positive. The second term is all multiplied by φ1t . This is sufficient to prove
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statement (iv). Indeed, whenφ1t = 0, then the second term disappears and ∂ X/∂t ≥ 0.
By continuity, this result must also hold in a neighbourhood of 0.
Under RD, A (Y c)− A (Y n) ≥ 0, so the sign of the second term in (A.2) is that
of −φ1t . Define 	(ii) as the value of φ1t such that ∂ X/∂t = 0. Then,
	(ii) = − f [Y − X ] D
[ f t + s]2
×
[
w (p) v′ (Y c)
φ1
+ φ1 [ f t + s] [Y − X ] [1 − w (p)] v′
(
Y n
) [
A
(
Y c
) − A (Y n)]
]−1
.
Notice that 	(ii) > 0. Statement (ii) follows immediately.
To prove part (iii) notice that A (Y c) − A (Y n) < 0 under PT. Then, although
	(iii) is written identically to 	(ii), its sign is no longer determined. If the term in
square brackets is positive, it follows that ∂ X/∂t ≥ 0 if φ1t ≤ 	(iii) and ∂ X/∂t < 0
if φ1t > 	(iii). However, if the term in brackets is negative, then ∂ X/∂t ≥ 0 if
φ1t > 	(iii) and ∂ X/∂t < 0 if φ1t < 	(iii). Finally, notice that the term in square
brackets is positive if its first (positive) term outweighs the second. This occurs when
φ1 = 0 (and by continuity, in its neighbourhood) and when s tends to s¯ (for then X
tends to Y and
[
A (Y c) − A (Y n)] tends to zero).
(v) Under the relevant parameter restrictions, the derivative ∂ X/∂t is
∂ X
∂t
= f t + s
D
[
[ f [[φ1 − 1] [Y − X ] + φ2] + [ f t + s]φ2t ] [φ1 − 1]w (p) v′′
(
Y c
)
+ [ f [φ1 [Y − X ] + φ2] + [ f t + s]φ2t ]φ1 [1 − w (p)] v′′
(
Y n
)]
.
Using the first-order condition in (4) and replacing εφ2,t ≡ t [φ2t/φ2], we obtain
∂ X
∂t
= f [Y − X ]
f t + s +
φ2
t
[
t f + [t f + s] εφ2,t
]
× A (Y
c) − A (Y n)
[ f t + s] [[φ1 − 1] A (Y c) − φ1 A (Y n)] .
The second-order condition in (5) writes as
∂2V
[∂ X ]2
= [ f t+s]2
[
w (p) [1−φ1]2 v′′
(
Y c
)+[1 − w (p)] [φ1]2 v′′
(
Y n
)]
< 0,
(A.3)
hence
[φ1 − 1] A
(
Y c
) − φ1 A
(
Y n
)
< 0.
As also A (Y c)−A (Y n) < 0 (under diminishing sensitivity), a sufficient condition
for ∂ X/∂t > 0 is, therefore, εφ2,t < − f t/ [ f t + s]. unionsq
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Proof of Lemma 3 We first prove the statements relative to d [E (Y )] /dt and then
move on to those relative to d
[
Y n
]
/dt . From E (Y ) = [ f t + s] [Y − X ]
[φ1 − w (p)] we compute
dE (Y )
dt
= f [Y − X ] [φ1 − w (p)] − [ f t + s] Xt [φ1 − w (p)]
+ [ f t + s] [Y − X ]φ1t = [φ1 − w (p)] [ f t + s]
×
[
f [Y − X ]
[ f t + s] − Xt
]
+ [ f t + s] [Y − X ]φ1t .
Replacing Xt by its expression, we obtain dE (Y ) /dt = φ1t with
 ≡ −1
[φ1 − 1] A (Y c) − φ1 A (Y n)
×
[
[Y − X ] [ f t + s]
[
[1 − w (p)] A (Y c)
+w (p) A (Y n)
]
+ [φ1 − w (p)]
[
pv′ (Y c)
]
[1 − p] [φ1]2 v′ (Y n)
]
.
Studying the sign of , by the second-order condition in (A.3), the initial fraction is
positive. Within the main square bracket, the first term is positive under RD while the
second term is always positive, for φ1 > w (p) by Lemma 2. This proves that under
RD d [E (Y )] /dt  0 ⇔ φ1t  0. Under PT, the first term in brackets may take
negative values. However, for s = s (and, by continuity, in its neighbourhood), then
Y = X and the first term in square bracket is zero. This proves that for s sufficiently
close to s, d [E (Y )] /dt  0 ⇔ φ1t  0.
Moving to Y n , from Y n = φ1 [ f t + s] [Y − X ] we compute
d
[
Y n
]
∂t
= [ f φ1 + [t f + s]φ1t ] [Y − X ] − φ1 [ f t + s] Xt
= [ f t + s]
[
[Y − X ]
[
1 − [ f t+s]2[φ1]2[1−w(p)]v′(Y n)[A(Y c)−A(Y n)]D
]
− [ f t+s]D
[
w (p) v′ (Y c)
]
]
φ1t .
Under RD, A (Y c) − A (Y n) > 0; hence, all the terms in the bracket are pos-
itive. This directly implies that d
[
Y n
]
/dt  0 ⇔ φ1t  0. Instead, under
PT we have A (Y c) − A (Y n) < 0. However, for s = s (and, by continuity,
in its neighbourhood), then Y = X and the first term in square bracket is zero:
∂d
[
Y n
]
/∂t = − [ f t+s]2D
[
pv′ (Y c)
]
φ1t . This proves that for s sufficiently close
to s, d
[
Y n
]
/dt  0 ⇔ φ1t  0. unionsq
Proof of Lemma 4 Setting φ2 = 0 the taxpayer’s objective function can be written as
V = w (p) [[t f + s] [Y − X ]]β1−DSγ DS v (φ1 − 1)
+ [1 − w (p)] [t f + s]β [Y − X ]β v (φ1) . (A.4)
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Thus, ∂V/∂ X is found as
− [t f + s]β1−DSγ DS [Y − X ]β1−DSγ DS−1
×
[ [
β1−DSγ DSw (p) − [Y − X ]w′ p′] v (φ1 − 1)
+ [β1−DSγ DS [1 − w (p)] + [Y − X ]w′ p′] v (φ1)
]
.
If φ1 ≥ 1 then ∂V/∂ X < 0 and if φ1 ≤ 0 then ∂V/∂ X > 0. In either case, there
cannot be an interior maximum. Hence, at an interior maximum φ1 ∈ (0, 1). unionsq
Proof of Proposition 2 (i) Under LA ∧ PW the first-order condition is written, using
A9, as
∂V
∂ X
= w (p) {t [ f − 1] + s} v′ (Y c) − [1 − w (p)] tv′ (Y n)
+w′ p′ [v (Y c) − v (Y n)] = 0. (A.5)
Thus, ∂ X/∂t is found as
∂ X
∂t
= − 1
βD
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
[
βw (p) [ f − 1] − w′ p′ [X + f [Y − X ]]] v′ (Y c)
− [β [1 − w (p)] − w′ p′X] v′ (Y n)
− [βw (p) {t [ f − 1] + s} + w′ p′Y c] [X + f [Y − X ]] v′′ (Y c)
+ [βt [1 − w (p)] + w′ p′Y n] Xv′′ (Y n)
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
.
If s = 0, and noting that A (Y i ) = [1 − β] /Y i , i = c, n, ∂ X/∂t reduces to
∂ X
∂t
= − Y
βt D
⎧
⎨
⎩
w′ p′
[
v′ (Y n) − v′ (Y c) + [1 − β]
[
Y n−Y c
Y n
]
v′ (Y c)
]
+βtw (p) [ f − 1] [1 − β]
[
Y n−Y c
Y nY c
]
v′ (Y c)
⎫
⎬
⎭
. (A.6)
Now note that from the first-order condition and A9 we have
βtw (p) [ f − 1] + w′ p′Y c
βt [1 − w (p)] + w′ p′Y n =
v′ (Y n)
v′ (Y c)
=
[
Y c
Y n
]1−β
.
Then, defining φ (z) = z1−β , the first-order Taylor series expansion of φ (z) at z = 1
is g (z) = 1 − [1 − β] [1 − z]. Clearly, g(z) ≥ φ (z) for all z and g(z) > z1−β for all
z 	= 1, so
v′ (Y n)
v′ (Y c)
< g
(
Y c
Y n
)
= 1 − [1 − β]
[
Y n − Y c
Y n
]
.
Rearranging, we obtain
v′
(
Y n
) − v′ (Y c) + [1 − β]
[
Y n − Y c
Y n
]
v′
(
Y c
)
< 0, (A.7)
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which signs (A.6) positive. As Eq. (A.6) holds for w (p) = p, and it is independent
of λ, ∂ X/∂t ≥ 0 also holds under EUT. If s ↑ s¯ then ∂ X/∂t instead writes as
∂ X
∂t
= lim
s↑s¯
w (p) s
t D
v′
(
Y c
)
< 0.
(ii)–(iii) Setting φ2 = 0 the taxpayer’s objective function is given by (A.4). Using the
first order condition, we obtain
∂ X
∂t
= [t f + s]
β1−DSγ DS [Y − X ]β1−DSγ DS−1
D
×
[
β1−DSγ DSw (p) − [Y − X ]w′ p′
]
v (φ1 − 1)
×
[
f
[
β1−DSγ DS − β
]
+ φ1t [ f t + s] β
1−DSγ DSφ1 − β [φ1 − 1]
φ1 [φ1 − 1]
]
.
Under PT (DS = 1) we, therefore, obtain
∂ X
∂t
= [t f + s]
β [Y − X ]β−1
φ1D
φ1t
[
βw (p) − [Y − X ]w′ p′] v (φ1 − 1) , (A.8)
which takes the sign of −φ1t . Under RD (DS = 0) we obtain
∂ X
∂t
 0 ⇔ φ1t  f
[
γ − β]φ1 [φ1 − 1]
[t f + s] [γφ1 − β [φ1 − 1]
] < 0.
unionsq
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